JOEL 2:3,30
3 A fire devoureth (ATOMIC BOMB) before them;(RUSSIAN-ARAB-MUSLIM ARMIES AGAINST ISRAEL) and behind them a flame burneth: the land is as the garden of Eden before them, and behind them a desolate wilderness; yea, and nothing shall escape them.
30 And I will shew wonders in the heavens and in the earth, blood, and fire, and pillars of smoke.(ATOMIC BOMB AFFECT)
ZECHARIAH 14:12-13
12 And this shall be the plague wherewith the LORD will smite all the people that have fought against Jerusalem; Their flesh shall consume away while they stand upon their feet,(DISOLVED FROM ATOMIC BOMB) and their eyes shall consume away in their holes,(DISOLVED FROM ATOMIC BOMB) and their tongue shall consume away in their mouth.(DISOLVED FROM ATOMIC BOMB)(BECAUSE NUKES HAVE BEEN USED ON ISRAELS ENEMIES)(GOD PROTECTS ISRAEL AND ALWAYS WILL)
13 And it shall come to pass in that day, that a great tumult from the LORD shall be among them; and they shall lay hold every one on the hand of his neighbour, and his hand shall rise up against the hand of his neighbour.(1/2-3 BILLION DIE IN WW3)(THIS IS AN ATOMIC BOMB EFFECT)
EZEKIEL 20:47
47 And say to the forest of the south, Hear the word of the LORD; Thus saith the Lord GOD; Behold, I will kindle a fire in thee, and it shall devour every green tree in thee, and every dry tree: the flaming flame shall not be quenched, and all faces from the south to the north shall be burned therein.
CANADA STANDS STRONG AND FREE-LOOKOUT ISLAM-STEPHEN HARPER
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4GAfS41FQc&list=PL3DmZ_MO1MKSBP296bPDd2LvutJof1FDZ
Op-Ed: Acknowledging the Core Importance of Doctrine-The especially urgent problems now associated with a steadily nuclearizing Iran should not have to be addressed by Israel on a case-by-case or ad hoc basis.Published: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 10:48 PM Prof. Louis René Beres
Special to Israel National News
Oddly, perhaps, especially at a time of expanding existential peril, Israel has yet to make any substantive policy disclosures about its nuclear deterrent. To be sure, two former prime ministers, during their respective governing tenures, exhibited substantial “slips of the tongue" on this sensitive issue. Nonetheless, no purposefully explicit or meaningfully nuanced strategic details were ever disclosed by Premiers Shimon Peres or Ehud Olmert. Always, the bomb remained deliberately vague and obscure, still carefully well-hidden in the country's metaphoric "basement."Even today, with an apt regard for specific Israeli policies, key components, and operational details, everything nuclear is shrouded in “deliberate ambiguity.” For Jerusalem, everything nuclear continues to be "opaque." This is policy.
But is this policy smart?
On its face, the continuing Israeli commitment to a nuclear status quo does seem to make sense. After all, at least at the most obvious security levels, Israel's usual state adversaries remain reluctant to launch any new major wars. Strategic planners, therefore, are entitled to ask: "Why rock the boat"Whatever Jerusalem chooses to say or not say, every conceivable adversary is already convinced that Israel has nuclear weapons. Indeed, to believe otherwise, at this point, would be preposterous. Also, U.S. President Barack Obama, plainly less than a fan of Israel's key decision-makers, would likely object to any tangible disclosures of Israel's nuclear posture. Such disclosures, it seems clear, could prove problematic for Washington.There is more. The United States, either wittingly, or in conspicuous reaction to certain foreign government expectations, might react to any incremental Israeli nuclear disclosures by pressuring Jerusalem to join the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In this continuing matter, it is worth recalling, President Barack Obama has never pulled back discernibly from his oft-stated preference for “a world free of nuclear weapons.”For Israel, this is a potentially injurious preference. Instead, for the Jewish State, the authentically durable mantra ought to be: Si vis pacem, para bellum atomicum. "If you want peace, prepare for nuclear war." Plainly, Mr. Obama has yet to think through the bewilderingly complex dialectics of uncertainty in a denuclearizing world. For its part, and simply to "stay alive," Israel must plan reluctantly but also recognizably for nuclear war.In the end, Israel could not long endure without nuclear weapons. Assuredly, these weapons are not needed primarily for the purpose of any actual war fighting, but rather for protracted strategic deterrence. Or, in the considered words of the Project Daniel final report, Israel's Strategic Future (2004): "The primary point of Israel's nuclear forces must always be deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post."Soon, there may arise a distinctly overriding reason for taking the bomb out of the "basement." This reason would be the inevitably complex requirements of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrence posture. To present such an essential posture, Israel’s nuclear weapons, inter alia, will always need to appear sufficiently invulnerable to preemptive destruction by all would-be adversaries.These nuclear weapons will also need to be seen as “penetration capable” (recognizably able to hit their intended targets) and “usable” (able to be taken seriously, that is, as a plausible retaliation for certain enemy aggressions). If any of these particular enemy perceptions were absent, Israel’s nuclear weapons might not be taken with sufficient seriousness to serve as a sustainably credible deterrent. This could be the case, moreover, even though their physical existence and destructiveness would appear altogether obvious.For Israel’s nuclear weapons to protect against massive enemy attacks, some of which could sometime be genuinely existential in magnitude, Israel now needs to refine, operationalize, and possibly declare certain precise elements of its strategic doctrine and associated ordnance. Such action would be needed, among other things, to enhance deterrence credibility along the entire spectrum of major security threats, and also to provide Israel with broad conceptual frameworks from which particular decisions and tactics could be suitably extrapolated.
In principle, the especially urgent problems now associated with a steadily nuclearizing Iran should not have to be addressed by Israel on a case-by-case or ad hoc basis. Rather, Israel should stay prepared to fashion its best available response to the unprecedented Iranian nuclear threat within the broader and more coherent context of an antecedent strategic theory. In all fields, including strategic studies, theory is a “net.” Only those who cast, will catch.From Plato's time onward, dialectical thinking has required the disciplined asking and answering of certain questions. It follows that to shape its necessary strategic doctrine, Israel should promptly address the following absolutely core questions:Shall Israel begin to openly identify certain general elements of its nuclear arsenal and nuclear plans? If so, how? Would it be in Israel's best security interest to make certain others aware, at least in general terms, of its nuclear targeting doctrine; its retaliatory and counter-retaliatory capacities; its willingness under particular conditions to preempt; its willingness under particular conditions to undertake nuclear reprisals; and its corollary capacities for ballistic missile defense? If so, to what extent? A simple Arab/Islamic awareness of the Israeli bomb can never automatically imply that Israel maintains a truly credible nuclear deterrent. If, for example, Israel's nuclear arsenal were seen as vulnerable to enemy first-strikes, it still might not persuade certain enemy states to resist attacking the Jewish State. Similarly, if Israel's political leadership were seen as unwilling to resort to nuclear weapons in reprisal for anything but unconventional and fully exterminatory strikes, these enemy states might also not be deterred.If Israel's nuclear weapons were seen as uniformly too large, too destructive, and too indiscriminate for any rational use, deterrence could fail. And if Israel's targeting doctrine were seen as too predominantly “counterforce,” that is, targeted exclusively or even primarily, on enemy state weapons with supporting military infrastructures, would-be attackers might then not anticipate sufficiently high expected costs. They might, in consequence, not be deterred.As was acknowledged in the 2004 Project Daniel final report, Israel's Strategic Future, a presumptive counter-force targeting doctrine could also be damaging to Israel, here, because it could enlarge the probabilities of nuclear war fighting. Always, we must recall, Israel’s nuclear weapons should be oriented toward deterrence, and never to actual conflict. With this in mind, Israeli planners and leaders (in stark contrast to the recent nuclear military planning operationalized in Pakistan) have likely opted not to build or deploy tactical/theatre nuclear forces.If Israel's targeting doctrine were judged to be too predominantly "counterforce,” enemy states could so fear an Israeli first-strike that they would then consider more seriously striking first themselves. This more-or-less reasonable scenario would represent, in effect, a preemption of the preemption, an ironic situation, a danse macabre wherein the intended object of anticipatory self-defense (the proper legal term for any permissible preemption) would itself strike “defensively.”The dialectical dynamics of any such strategic calculations are hideously complex. In this connection, aware of the counter-city/counterforce options and implications, Israel's leaders should quickly determine the most favorable means and levels of any prospective nuclear disclosure. How shall enemy states best be apprised of Israel's targeting doctrine, so that these particular adversaries could be deterred from all forms of both first-strike and retaliatory strike action? Here is the strategic bottom line: To ensure long-term survival of Israel, it can never be sufficient that Israel's enemies merely know that the Jewish State has nuclear weapons. They must also be convinced, always, that these atomic arms are sufficiently secure and usable, and that Israel's designated leadership is determinedly willing to launch them in response to certain first-strike and/or retaliatory aggressions.No enemy state should ever be allowed to assume that Israel could be massively attacked with impunity.Always, Israel's strategic doctrine must aim at strengthening nuclear deterrence. Jerusalem can meet this utterly core objective only by convincing enemy states that a first-strike upon Israel will always be irrational. More precisely, this means successfully communicating to enemy states that the costs of any such strike will always exceed the benefits.
Iran could effectively emerge as a suicide-bomber in macrocosm.
Without exception, Israel's strategic doctrine must convince prospective attackers that their intended victim has both the willingness and the capacity to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Where an enemy state considering an attack upon Israel were somehow unconvinced about either or both of these fundamental components of nuclear deterrence, it could still choose rationally to strike first. Of course, this would depend, at least in part, upon the particular value it had originally placed upon the expected consequences of any such attack.Regarding willingness, even if Israel were fully prepared to respond to certain Arab/Islamic attacks with nuclear reprisals, any residual enemy failure to actually recognize such preparedness could provoke an attack upon Israel. Misperception and/or errors in information could quickly immobilize Israeli nuclear deterrence. It is also conceivable that Israel would, in fact, simply lack the willingness to retaliate, and that this damaging lack of willingness were perceived correctly by enemy state decision-makers. In this very worrisome case, Israeli nuclear deterrence would be immobilized, not because of any confused signals, but because of signals that had not been suitably distorted.Regarding capacity, even if Israel were to maintain a substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons, it is essential that enemy states will always believe these weapons to be distinctly usable. This means that if a first-strike attack were ever believed capable of sufficiently destroying Israel's atomic arsenal and associated infrastructures, that country's nuclear deterrent could conceivably be immobilized. To best guard against any such perilous eventuality, Jerusalem would be well-advised to continue working closely at improving all viable and affordable submarine nuclear basing options.[1]-Even if Israel's nuclear weapons were configured such that they could not be destroyed by an enemy first-strike, enemy misperceptions or misjudgments about Israeli vulnerability could still bring about the catastrophic failure of Israeli nuclear deterrence. A further complication here concerns enemy state deployment of anti-tactical ballistic missiles, deployments which could contribute to an affirmative attack decision against Israel, by lowering the attacker's own expected costs.The importance of usable nuclear weapons must also be examined from the standpoint of probable harms. Should Israel's nuclear weapons be perceived by a would-be attacker as uniformly too high-yield, or "city-busting" weapons, they might also fail to deter. In certain circumstances, successful nuclear deterrence could even vary inversely with perceived destructiveness, at least to a point. This does not mean that Israel should ever incline toward a nuclear war-fighting doctrine (it assuredly should not), but only that it must always be aware of possibly subtle or eccentric decisional correlations between successful nuclear deterrence, and enemy perceptions of nuclear destructiveness.This brings us back to the over-all core importance of Israeli strategic doctrine. To the extent that this doctrine were to identify certain nuanced and graduated forms of reprisal - forms calibrating Israeli retaliations somewhat to particular levels of provocation – any disclosure of such doctrine could enhance Israeli nuclear deterrence. Without such disclosure, Israel's enemies would be kept guessing about the Jewish State's probable responses, a condition of persistent uncertainty that could possibly serve Israel's security for a while longer, but, at one time or another, could also fail altogether.It is time for one final observation, one already familiar to Israeli strategic planners. All nuclear deterrence is contingent upon an assumption of enemy rationality. This means that in calculating deterrence, an enemy must always be assumed to value its continued physical survival more highly than any other preference, or combination of preferences. Where this assumption might be unwarranted, all deterrence “bets” could be off, and the would-be deterrer’s own survival would likely depend upon certain apt forms of preemption, and/or ballistic missile defense - that is, BMD displaying a near-perfect “reliability of intercept.”In the relentlessly urgent matter of nuclear Iran, a peril that intersects synergistically with a broad variety of corollary terror threats in the region, Israel will soon have to decide whether that country could sometime be animated more by Jihadist visions of a Shiite apocalypse, than by the usual strategic considerations of national survival. This portentous prospect, one wherein Iran could effectively emerge as a suicide-bomber in macrocosm, is highly improbable, but it is not inconceivable.Credo quia absurdum. "I believe because it is absurd." Israel should never construct its overall strategic doctrine upon such an eccentric mantra, but it also ought not ignore this potentially insightful paradox. In the end, this means a core responsibility to plan carefully for long-term nuclear deterrence of a rational nuclear Iran, but also to simultaneously make preparations for dealing with an already nuclear Iran that might sometime value certain religious preferences even more highly than collective physical survival. By definition, any such residual preparations would have to include viable plans for threatening to obstruct those particular Islamic religious values that Tehran might determinably value more highly than any other national preference, or combination of such preferences.In terms of nuclear deterrence, irrationality is not the same as madness. If properly understood, even an irrational national adversary can be deterred. For Israel, going forward, this means a more precise and obligatory understanding of Iran's expected ordering of religious (Shiite Islamic) preferences.As for any eleventh-hour Israeli resort to preemption or "anticipatory self- defense," it would, of course, need to be undertaken before Iran became operationally nuclear. For the moment, this starkly alternative option to long-term nuclear deterrence remains logically possible, but also manifestly unlikely. In essence, at this late stage, the expected costs to Israel of any defensive first-strike would plausibly exceed the expected gains.Si vis pacem, para bellum atomicum ."If you want peace, prepare for nuclear war."
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LOUIS RENÉ BERES was born in Zürich, Switzerland (August 31, 1945), and educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971). He is the author of many major books and articles dealing with nuclear strategy and nuclear war, and a frequent contributor to Israel National News. Professor Beres' tenth book, Israel's Nuclear Strategy: Surviving Amid Chaos, will be published later this year. The Chair of Project Daniel (Israel, 2003, PM Sharon), his work is well-known in both Israeli and American senior military/intelligence communities. See, for example, Louis René Beres and (Major General) Isaac Ben-Israel (IDF/res.), "Deterring an Iranian Nuclear Attack," The Washington Times, January 27, 2009; Louis René Beres and (General) John T. Chain (USAF/ret.), "Could Israel Safely Deter a Nuclear Iran,"? The Atlantic, August 2012; Louis René Beres and (General) John T. Chain (USAF/ret.), "Living With Iran: Israel's Strategic Imperative," Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (Israel), BESA Perspective Paper # 249, May 28, 2014. Professor Beres' most recent scholarly articles were published in the Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard Law School), the Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, and the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.[1] See, on these options: Louis René Beres and Admiral (USN/ret.) Leon "Bud" Edney, "Israel's Nuclear Strategy: A Larger Role for Submarine Basing," The Jerusalem Post, August 17, 2014; and Professor Beres and Admiral Edney, "A Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent for Israel," Washington Times, September 5, 2014.
EZEKIEL 38:1-7
1 And the word of the LORD came unto me, saying,
2 Son of man, set thy face against Gog,(RULER) the land of Magog,(RUSSIA) the chief prince of Meshech (MOSCOW) and Tubal,(TOBOLSK) and prophesy against him,
3 And say, Thus saith the Lord GOD; Behold, I am against thee, O Gog,(LEADER OF RUSSIA) the chief prince of Meshech(MOSCOW) and Tubal:TOBOLSK)
4 And I will turn thee back, and put hooks into thy jaws,(GOD FORCES THE RUSSIA-MUSLIMS TO MARCH) and I will bring thee forth, and all thine army, horses and horsemen, all of them clothed with all sorts of armour, even a great company with bucklers and shields, all of them handling swords:
5 Persia,(IRAN,IRAQ) Ethiopia, and Libya with them; all of them with shield and helmet:
6 Gomer,(GERMANY) and all his bands; the house of Togarmah (TURKEY) of the north quarters, and all his bands: and many people with thee.(AFRICAN MUSLIMS,SUDAN,TUNESIA ETC)
7 Be thou prepared, and prepare for thyself, thou, and all thy company that are assembled unto thee, and be thou a guard unto them.
JEREMEIAH 49:35-37 (IN IRAN AT THE BUSHEHR OR ARAK NUKE SITE SOME BELIEVE)
35 Thus saith the LORD of hosts; Behold, I will break the bow of Elam,(IRAN/BUSHEHR NUCLEAR SITE) the chief of their might.(MOST DANGEROUS NUKE SITE IN IRAN)
36 And upon Elam will I bring the four winds from the four quarters of heaven,(IRANIANS SCATTERED OR MASS IMIGARATION) and will scatter them toward all those winds; and there shall be no nation whither the outcasts of Elam shall not come.(WORLD IMMIGRATION)
37 For I will cause Elam (IRAN-BUSHEHR NUKE SITE) to be dismayed before their enemies, and before them that seek their life: and I will bring evil upon them, even my fierce anger,(ISRAELS NUKES POSSIBLY) saith the LORD; and I will send the sword after them, till I have consumed them:(IRAN AND ITS NUKE SITES DESTROYED)
ISAIAH 17:1,11-14
1 The burden of Damascus. Behold, Damascus is taken away from being a city, and it shall be a ruinous heap.
11 In the day shalt thou make thy plant to grow, and in the morning shalt thou make thy seed to flourish: but the harvest shall be a heap in the day of grief and of desperate sorrow.
12 Woe to the multitude of many people, which make a noise like the noise of the seas; and to the rushing of nations,(USELESS U.N) that make a rushing like the rushing of mighty waters!
13 The nations shall rush like the rushing of many waters: but God shall rebuke them, and they shall flee far off, and shall be chased as the chaff of the mountains before the wind, and like a rolling thing before the whirlwind.
14 And behold at evening tide trouble; and before the morning he is not.(ASSAD KILLED IN OVERNIGHT RAID) This is the portion of them that spoil us,(ISRAEL) and the lot of them that rob us.
AMOS 1:5
5 I will break also the bar of Damascus, and cut off the inhabitant from the plain of Aven, and him that holdeth the sceptre from the house of Eden:(IRAQ) and the people of Syria shall go into captivity unto Kir,(JORDAN) saith the LORD.(I belive ISIS-DAMASCUS GET NUKED BY ISRAEL)
JEREMEIAH 49:23-27
23 Concerning Damascus.(SYRIA) Hamath is confounded, and Arpad: for they have heard evil tidings: they are fainthearted; there is sorrow on the sea;(WAR SHIPS WITH NUKES COMING ON SYRIA) it cannot be quiet.
24 Damascus is waxed feeble, and turneth herself to flee, and fear hath seized on her: anguish and sorrows have taken her, as a woman in travail.
25 How is the city of praise not left, the city of my joy!
26 Therefore her young men shall fall in her streets, and all the men of war shall be cut off in that day, saith the LORD of hosts.
27 And I will kindle a fire (NUKES OR BOMBS) in the wall of Damascus, and it shall consume the palaces of Benhadad.(ASSADS PALACES POSSIBLY IN DAMASCUS)
PSALMS 83:3-7
3 They (ARABS,MUSLIMS) have taken crafty counsel against thy people,(ISRAEL) and consulted against thy hidden ones.
4 They have said, Come, and let us cut them off from being a nation; that the name of Israel may be no more in remembrance.
5 For they (MUSLIMS) have consulted together with one consent: they are confederate against thee:(TREATIES)
6 The tabernacles of Edom,(JORDAN) and the Ishmaelites;(ARABS) of Moab, PALESTINIANS,JORDAN) and the Hagarenes;(EGYPT)
7 Gebal,(HEZZBALLOH,LEBANON) and Ammon,(JORDAN) and Amalek;(SYRIA,ARABS,SINAI) the Philistines (PALESTINIANS) with the inhabitants of Tyre;(LEBANON)
PM Vows: Hezbollah, Iran Will 'Pay a Price' for Soldiers' Deaths-Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said that those responsible for the deaths of two IDF soldiers would “pay the price for their actions."By Yaakov Levi-First Publish: 1/28/2015, 8:59 PM-ISRAELNATIONALNEWS
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said Wednesday that the parties responsible for the attack on Har Dov earlier in the day that claimed the lives of two IDF soldiers would “pay the full price for their actions.” Netanyahu made the comments Wednesday evening before a meeting of top army and government officials discussing the attack by Hezbollah terrorists earlier Wednesday.Two IDF soldiers were killed earlier Wednesday when Lebanese terror group fired antitank missiles at two IDF vehicles in the Har Dov area (Shebaa Farms) in a Hezbollah ambush.Six casualties in light to moderate condition were taken to Ziv Hospital in Tzfat. Additional casualties were evacuated to Rambam Hospital.The IDF vigorously denied Hezbollah claims that an IDF soldier had been kidnapped, and a Lebanese report later confirmed that Hezbollah had failed to capture an Israeli soldier.The two soldiers killed were identified as Major Yochai Kalangel and Sgt. Dor Nini, the IDF Spokesperson's Office announced. Netanyahu sent condolences to the families of the two victims, and wished the six soldiers injured in the attack a speedy recovery.“Those who committed these acts will pay the full price for their actions,” Netanyahu said. “For a long time Iran has been using Hezbollah to establish a terror front against us on the Golan. We are aggressively acting to prevent this. The government of Lebanon and the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria are responsible for attacks on Israel that emerge from their territory.“Our single goal is to defend Israel and Israelis,” Netanyahu added. “We have acted this way in the past, and will continue to do so.”
UN Security Council Calls Emergency Meeting Over Lebanon-UNIFIL to hold hearing on antitank missile attack on Israeli soil amid fears of an impending war.By Arutz Sheva Staff-First Publish: 1/28/2015, 10:10 PM / Last Update: 1/28/2015, 10:14 PM-ISRAELNATIONALNEWS
The UN Security Council has called an emergency meeting from 2100 GMT on Wednesday to discuss the flare-up of violence on the Israeli-Lebanon border, diplomats told AFP.France requested the urgent talks in the 15-member council after two Israeli soldiers and a Spanish UN peacekeeper died in the exchange of fire between Israeli forces and Hezbollah terrorists.The violence raised fears of another all-out conflict between the two countries, who fought a month-long war in 2006, in a region already wracked by fighting with Islamists in Syria and Iraq.Tension in the area has been building, especially after an Israeli air strike on the Syrian sector of the Golan Heights killed six Hezbollah terrorists and an Iranian general on January 18.Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations told the Security Council in a letter that Israel will take all necessary measures to defend itself in response to the Hezbollah attack."Israel will not stand by as Hezbollah targets Israelis," wrote Ron Prosor in the letter also sent to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.The Israeli envoy demanded that the council condemn Hezbollah and take steps to press Lebanon to disarm the Islamist militants as outlined in UN resolutions.The clashes began when Hezbollah fired an estimated 5-6 anti-tank missiles at a military convoy in Israel, prompting Israel to respond with air and ground strikes.The 10,000-strong UNIFIL mission said it had observed six rockets fired towards Israel from southern Lebanon and that Israeli forces "returned artillery fire in the same general area".The council will be meeting behind closed doors and hear a report from a senior peacekeeping official overseeing UNIFIL operations.
Is Hezbollah Digging Tunnels to Israel? IDF Intends to Find Out-For many, the prospect that Hezbollah is preparing an underground assault is far more worrisome than a mortar attack.By Moshe Cohen-First Publish: 1/28/2015, 5:22 PM-ISRAELNATIONALNEWS
On Wednesday, Hezbollah terrorist fired mortar shells at IDF vehicles in the area of Har Dov in the northern Golan – a serious enough incident, but an open one that the IDF can fight. It's the kind of attack that takes place once in awhile, but residents of northern Israel have learned to take them in stride.Far more worrying to them, however, is the prospect that Hezbollah is preparing another kind of attack – an underground one, via Hamas-style tunnels that many believe are being dug even as Hezbollah attacks IDF jeeps in the Golan.Many residents of the north have complained of hearing underground noises – some of which were very loud, and sounded very much like the sound of heavy drilling. The IDF, said Shimon Gueta, head of the Upper Galilee Regional Council, is taking these reports seriously and is actively examining these complaints. Speaking to Arutz Sheva, Gueta said that he could not explain the phenomenon, but that he had spoken to many IDF officials, and all of them have said that so far, nothing has been found. “Because there have been so many complaints recently, they are intensifying the investigations,” he added.Meanwhile, Gueta said, residents of the north were persevering with the increased security situation that transpired Wednesday, and that most of the area was now “back to normal.” While many tourists who had been set to visit the region this weekend canceled their reservations, Gueta said he was optimistic that visitors would return – if, of course, the situation calms down.Earlier Wednesday, the Lebanese terror group fired antitank missiles at two IDF vehicles in the Har Dov area (Shebaa Farms) in a Hezbollah ambush Wednesday morning. Seven people were wounded and two soldiers were killed. The IDF vigorously denied Hezbollah claims that an IDF soldier had been kidnapped, and a Lebanese report later confirmed that Hezbollah had failed to capture an Israeli soldier.
3 A fire devoureth (ATOMIC BOMB) before them;(RUSSIAN-ARAB-MUSLIM ARMIES AGAINST ISRAEL) and behind them a flame burneth: the land is as the garden of Eden before them, and behind them a desolate wilderness; yea, and nothing shall escape them.
30 And I will shew wonders in the heavens and in the earth, blood, and fire, and pillars of smoke.(ATOMIC BOMB AFFECT)
ZECHARIAH 14:12-13
12 And this shall be the plague wherewith the LORD will smite all the people that have fought against Jerusalem; Their flesh shall consume away while they stand upon their feet,(DISOLVED FROM ATOMIC BOMB) and their eyes shall consume away in their holes,(DISOLVED FROM ATOMIC BOMB) and their tongue shall consume away in their mouth.(DISOLVED FROM ATOMIC BOMB)(BECAUSE NUKES HAVE BEEN USED ON ISRAELS ENEMIES)(GOD PROTECTS ISRAEL AND ALWAYS WILL)
13 And it shall come to pass in that day, that a great tumult from the LORD shall be among them; and they shall lay hold every one on the hand of his neighbour, and his hand shall rise up against the hand of his neighbour.(1/2-3 BILLION DIE IN WW3)(THIS IS AN ATOMIC BOMB EFFECT)
EZEKIEL 20:47
47 And say to the forest of the south, Hear the word of the LORD; Thus saith the Lord GOD; Behold, I will kindle a fire in thee, and it shall devour every green tree in thee, and every dry tree: the flaming flame shall not be quenched, and all faces from the south to the north shall be burned therein.
CANADA STANDS STRONG AND FREE-LOOKOUT ISLAM-STEPHEN HARPER
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4GAfS41FQc&list=PL3DmZ_MO1MKSBP296bPDd2LvutJof1FDZ
Op-Ed: Acknowledging the Core Importance of Doctrine-The especially urgent problems now associated with a steadily nuclearizing Iran should not have to be addressed by Israel on a case-by-case or ad hoc basis.Published: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 10:48 PM Prof. Louis René Beres
Special to Israel National News
Oddly, perhaps, especially at a time of expanding existential peril, Israel has yet to make any substantive policy disclosures about its nuclear deterrent. To be sure, two former prime ministers, during their respective governing tenures, exhibited substantial “slips of the tongue" on this sensitive issue. Nonetheless, no purposefully explicit or meaningfully nuanced strategic details were ever disclosed by Premiers Shimon Peres or Ehud Olmert. Always, the bomb remained deliberately vague and obscure, still carefully well-hidden in the country's metaphoric "basement."Even today, with an apt regard for specific Israeli policies, key components, and operational details, everything nuclear is shrouded in “deliberate ambiguity.” For Jerusalem, everything nuclear continues to be "opaque." This is policy.
But is this policy smart?
On its face, the continuing Israeli commitment to a nuclear status quo does seem to make sense. After all, at least at the most obvious security levels, Israel's usual state adversaries remain reluctant to launch any new major wars. Strategic planners, therefore, are entitled to ask: "Why rock the boat"Whatever Jerusalem chooses to say or not say, every conceivable adversary is already convinced that Israel has nuclear weapons. Indeed, to believe otherwise, at this point, would be preposterous. Also, U.S. President Barack Obama, plainly less than a fan of Israel's key decision-makers, would likely object to any tangible disclosures of Israel's nuclear posture. Such disclosures, it seems clear, could prove problematic for Washington.There is more. The United States, either wittingly, or in conspicuous reaction to certain foreign government expectations, might react to any incremental Israeli nuclear disclosures by pressuring Jerusalem to join the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In this continuing matter, it is worth recalling, President Barack Obama has never pulled back discernibly from his oft-stated preference for “a world free of nuclear weapons.”For Israel, this is a potentially injurious preference. Instead, for the Jewish State, the authentically durable mantra ought to be: Si vis pacem, para bellum atomicum. "If you want peace, prepare for nuclear war." Plainly, Mr. Obama has yet to think through the bewilderingly complex dialectics of uncertainty in a denuclearizing world. For its part, and simply to "stay alive," Israel must plan reluctantly but also recognizably for nuclear war.In the end, Israel could not long endure without nuclear weapons. Assuredly, these weapons are not needed primarily for the purpose of any actual war fighting, but rather for protracted strategic deterrence. Or, in the considered words of the Project Daniel final report, Israel's Strategic Future (2004): "The primary point of Israel's nuclear forces must always be deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post."Soon, there may arise a distinctly overriding reason for taking the bomb out of the "basement." This reason would be the inevitably complex requirements of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrence posture. To present such an essential posture, Israel’s nuclear weapons, inter alia, will always need to appear sufficiently invulnerable to preemptive destruction by all would-be adversaries.These nuclear weapons will also need to be seen as “penetration capable” (recognizably able to hit their intended targets) and “usable” (able to be taken seriously, that is, as a plausible retaliation for certain enemy aggressions). If any of these particular enemy perceptions were absent, Israel’s nuclear weapons might not be taken with sufficient seriousness to serve as a sustainably credible deterrent. This could be the case, moreover, even though their physical existence and destructiveness would appear altogether obvious.For Israel’s nuclear weapons to protect against massive enemy attacks, some of which could sometime be genuinely existential in magnitude, Israel now needs to refine, operationalize, and possibly declare certain precise elements of its strategic doctrine and associated ordnance. Such action would be needed, among other things, to enhance deterrence credibility along the entire spectrum of major security threats, and also to provide Israel with broad conceptual frameworks from which particular decisions and tactics could be suitably extrapolated.
In principle, the especially urgent problems now associated with a steadily nuclearizing Iran should not have to be addressed by Israel on a case-by-case or ad hoc basis. Rather, Israel should stay prepared to fashion its best available response to the unprecedented Iranian nuclear threat within the broader and more coherent context of an antecedent strategic theory. In all fields, including strategic studies, theory is a “net.” Only those who cast, will catch.From Plato's time onward, dialectical thinking has required the disciplined asking and answering of certain questions. It follows that to shape its necessary strategic doctrine, Israel should promptly address the following absolutely core questions:Shall Israel begin to openly identify certain general elements of its nuclear arsenal and nuclear plans? If so, how? Would it be in Israel's best security interest to make certain others aware, at least in general terms, of its nuclear targeting doctrine; its retaliatory and counter-retaliatory capacities; its willingness under particular conditions to preempt; its willingness under particular conditions to undertake nuclear reprisals; and its corollary capacities for ballistic missile defense? If so, to what extent? A simple Arab/Islamic awareness of the Israeli bomb can never automatically imply that Israel maintains a truly credible nuclear deterrent. If, for example, Israel's nuclear arsenal were seen as vulnerable to enemy first-strikes, it still might not persuade certain enemy states to resist attacking the Jewish State. Similarly, if Israel's political leadership were seen as unwilling to resort to nuclear weapons in reprisal for anything but unconventional and fully exterminatory strikes, these enemy states might also not be deterred.If Israel's nuclear weapons were seen as uniformly too large, too destructive, and too indiscriminate for any rational use, deterrence could fail. And if Israel's targeting doctrine were seen as too predominantly “counterforce,” that is, targeted exclusively or even primarily, on enemy state weapons with supporting military infrastructures, would-be attackers might then not anticipate sufficiently high expected costs. They might, in consequence, not be deterred.As was acknowledged in the 2004 Project Daniel final report, Israel's Strategic Future, a presumptive counter-force targeting doctrine could also be damaging to Israel, here, because it could enlarge the probabilities of nuclear war fighting. Always, we must recall, Israel’s nuclear weapons should be oriented toward deterrence, and never to actual conflict. With this in mind, Israeli planners and leaders (in stark contrast to the recent nuclear military planning operationalized in Pakistan) have likely opted not to build or deploy tactical/theatre nuclear forces.If Israel's targeting doctrine were judged to be too predominantly "counterforce,” enemy states could so fear an Israeli first-strike that they would then consider more seriously striking first themselves. This more-or-less reasonable scenario would represent, in effect, a preemption of the preemption, an ironic situation, a danse macabre wherein the intended object of anticipatory self-defense (the proper legal term for any permissible preemption) would itself strike “defensively.”The dialectical dynamics of any such strategic calculations are hideously complex. In this connection, aware of the counter-city/counterforce options and implications, Israel's leaders should quickly determine the most favorable means and levels of any prospective nuclear disclosure. How shall enemy states best be apprised of Israel's targeting doctrine, so that these particular adversaries could be deterred from all forms of both first-strike and retaliatory strike action? Here is the strategic bottom line: To ensure long-term survival of Israel, it can never be sufficient that Israel's enemies merely know that the Jewish State has nuclear weapons. They must also be convinced, always, that these atomic arms are sufficiently secure and usable, and that Israel's designated leadership is determinedly willing to launch them in response to certain first-strike and/or retaliatory aggressions.No enemy state should ever be allowed to assume that Israel could be massively attacked with impunity.Always, Israel's strategic doctrine must aim at strengthening nuclear deterrence. Jerusalem can meet this utterly core objective only by convincing enemy states that a first-strike upon Israel will always be irrational. More precisely, this means successfully communicating to enemy states that the costs of any such strike will always exceed the benefits.
Iran could effectively emerge as a suicide-bomber in macrocosm.
Without exception, Israel's strategic doctrine must convince prospective attackers that their intended victim has both the willingness and the capacity to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Where an enemy state considering an attack upon Israel were somehow unconvinced about either or both of these fundamental components of nuclear deterrence, it could still choose rationally to strike first. Of course, this would depend, at least in part, upon the particular value it had originally placed upon the expected consequences of any such attack.Regarding willingness, even if Israel were fully prepared to respond to certain Arab/Islamic attacks with nuclear reprisals, any residual enemy failure to actually recognize such preparedness could provoke an attack upon Israel. Misperception and/or errors in information could quickly immobilize Israeli nuclear deterrence. It is also conceivable that Israel would, in fact, simply lack the willingness to retaliate, and that this damaging lack of willingness were perceived correctly by enemy state decision-makers. In this very worrisome case, Israeli nuclear deterrence would be immobilized, not because of any confused signals, but because of signals that had not been suitably distorted.Regarding capacity, even if Israel were to maintain a substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons, it is essential that enemy states will always believe these weapons to be distinctly usable. This means that if a first-strike attack were ever believed capable of sufficiently destroying Israel's atomic arsenal and associated infrastructures, that country's nuclear deterrent could conceivably be immobilized. To best guard against any such perilous eventuality, Jerusalem would be well-advised to continue working closely at improving all viable and affordable submarine nuclear basing options.[1]-Even if Israel's nuclear weapons were configured such that they could not be destroyed by an enemy first-strike, enemy misperceptions or misjudgments about Israeli vulnerability could still bring about the catastrophic failure of Israeli nuclear deterrence. A further complication here concerns enemy state deployment of anti-tactical ballistic missiles, deployments which could contribute to an affirmative attack decision against Israel, by lowering the attacker's own expected costs.The importance of usable nuclear weapons must also be examined from the standpoint of probable harms. Should Israel's nuclear weapons be perceived by a would-be attacker as uniformly too high-yield, or "city-busting" weapons, they might also fail to deter. In certain circumstances, successful nuclear deterrence could even vary inversely with perceived destructiveness, at least to a point. This does not mean that Israel should ever incline toward a nuclear war-fighting doctrine (it assuredly should not), but only that it must always be aware of possibly subtle or eccentric decisional correlations between successful nuclear deterrence, and enemy perceptions of nuclear destructiveness.This brings us back to the over-all core importance of Israeli strategic doctrine. To the extent that this doctrine were to identify certain nuanced and graduated forms of reprisal - forms calibrating Israeli retaliations somewhat to particular levels of provocation – any disclosure of such doctrine could enhance Israeli nuclear deterrence. Without such disclosure, Israel's enemies would be kept guessing about the Jewish State's probable responses, a condition of persistent uncertainty that could possibly serve Israel's security for a while longer, but, at one time or another, could also fail altogether.It is time for one final observation, one already familiar to Israeli strategic planners. All nuclear deterrence is contingent upon an assumption of enemy rationality. This means that in calculating deterrence, an enemy must always be assumed to value its continued physical survival more highly than any other preference, or combination of preferences. Where this assumption might be unwarranted, all deterrence “bets” could be off, and the would-be deterrer’s own survival would likely depend upon certain apt forms of preemption, and/or ballistic missile defense - that is, BMD displaying a near-perfect “reliability of intercept.”In the relentlessly urgent matter of nuclear Iran, a peril that intersects synergistically with a broad variety of corollary terror threats in the region, Israel will soon have to decide whether that country could sometime be animated more by Jihadist visions of a Shiite apocalypse, than by the usual strategic considerations of national survival. This portentous prospect, one wherein Iran could effectively emerge as a suicide-bomber in macrocosm, is highly improbable, but it is not inconceivable.Credo quia absurdum. "I believe because it is absurd." Israel should never construct its overall strategic doctrine upon such an eccentric mantra, but it also ought not ignore this potentially insightful paradox. In the end, this means a core responsibility to plan carefully for long-term nuclear deterrence of a rational nuclear Iran, but also to simultaneously make preparations for dealing with an already nuclear Iran that might sometime value certain religious preferences even more highly than collective physical survival. By definition, any such residual preparations would have to include viable plans for threatening to obstruct those particular Islamic religious values that Tehran might determinably value more highly than any other national preference, or combination of such preferences.In terms of nuclear deterrence, irrationality is not the same as madness. If properly understood, even an irrational national adversary can be deterred. For Israel, going forward, this means a more precise and obligatory understanding of Iran's expected ordering of religious (Shiite Islamic) preferences.As for any eleventh-hour Israeli resort to preemption or "anticipatory self- defense," it would, of course, need to be undertaken before Iran became operationally nuclear. For the moment, this starkly alternative option to long-term nuclear deterrence remains logically possible, but also manifestly unlikely. In essence, at this late stage, the expected costs to Israel of any defensive first-strike would plausibly exceed the expected gains.Si vis pacem, para bellum atomicum ."If you want peace, prepare for nuclear war."
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LOUIS RENÉ BERES was born in Zürich, Switzerland (August 31, 1945), and educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971). He is the author of many major books and articles dealing with nuclear strategy and nuclear war, and a frequent contributor to Israel National News. Professor Beres' tenth book, Israel's Nuclear Strategy: Surviving Amid Chaos, will be published later this year. The Chair of Project Daniel (Israel, 2003, PM Sharon), his work is well-known in both Israeli and American senior military/intelligence communities. See, for example, Louis René Beres and (Major General) Isaac Ben-Israel (IDF/res.), "Deterring an Iranian Nuclear Attack," The Washington Times, January 27, 2009; Louis René Beres and (General) John T. Chain (USAF/ret.), "Could Israel Safely Deter a Nuclear Iran,"? The Atlantic, August 2012; Louis René Beres and (General) John T. Chain (USAF/ret.), "Living With Iran: Israel's Strategic Imperative," Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (Israel), BESA Perspective Paper # 249, May 28, 2014. Professor Beres' most recent scholarly articles were published in the Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard Law School), the Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, and the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.[1] See, on these options: Louis René Beres and Admiral (USN/ret.) Leon "Bud" Edney, "Israel's Nuclear Strategy: A Larger Role for Submarine Basing," The Jerusalem Post, August 17, 2014; and Professor Beres and Admiral Edney, "A Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent for Israel," Washington Times, September 5, 2014.
EZEKIEL 38:1-7
1 And the word of the LORD came unto me, saying,
2 Son of man, set thy face against Gog,(RULER) the land of Magog,(RUSSIA) the chief prince of Meshech (MOSCOW) and Tubal,(TOBOLSK) and prophesy against him,
3 And say, Thus saith the Lord GOD; Behold, I am against thee, O Gog,(LEADER OF RUSSIA) the chief prince of Meshech(MOSCOW) and Tubal:TOBOLSK)
4 And I will turn thee back, and put hooks into thy jaws,(GOD FORCES THE RUSSIA-MUSLIMS TO MARCH) and I will bring thee forth, and all thine army, horses and horsemen, all of them clothed with all sorts of armour, even a great company with bucklers and shields, all of them handling swords:
5 Persia,(IRAN,IRAQ) Ethiopia, and Libya with them; all of them with shield and helmet:
6 Gomer,(GERMANY) and all his bands; the house of Togarmah (TURKEY) of the north quarters, and all his bands: and many people with thee.(AFRICAN MUSLIMS,SUDAN,TUNESIA ETC)
7 Be thou prepared, and prepare for thyself, thou, and all thy company that are assembled unto thee, and be thou a guard unto them.
JEREMEIAH 49:35-37 (IN IRAN AT THE BUSHEHR OR ARAK NUKE SITE SOME BELIEVE)
35 Thus saith the LORD of hosts; Behold, I will break the bow of Elam,(IRAN/BUSHEHR NUCLEAR SITE) the chief of their might.(MOST DANGEROUS NUKE SITE IN IRAN)
36 And upon Elam will I bring the four winds from the four quarters of heaven,(IRANIANS SCATTERED OR MASS IMIGARATION) and will scatter them toward all those winds; and there shall be no nation whither the outcasts of Elam shall not come.(WORLD IMMIGRATION)
37 For I will cause Elam (IRAN-BUSHEHR NUKE SITE) to be dismayed before their enemies, and before them that seek their life: and I will bring evil upon them, even my fierce anger,(ISRAELS NUKES POSSIBLY) saith the LORD; and I will send the sword after them, till I have consumed them:(IRAN AND ITS NUKE SITES DESTROYED)
ISAIAH 17:1,11-14
1 The burden of Damascus. Behold, Damascus is taken away from being a city, and it shall be a ruinous heap.
11 In the day shalt thou make thy plant to grow, and in the morning shalt thou make thy seed to flourish: but the harvest shall be a heap in the day of grief and of desperate sorrow.
12 Woe to the multitude of many people, which make a noise like the noise of the seas; and to the rushing of nations,(USELESS U.N) that make a rushing like the rushing of mighty waters!
13 The nations shall rush like the rushing of many waters: but God shall rebuke them, and they shall flee far off, and shall be chased as the chaff of the mountains before the wind, and like a rolling thing before the whirlwind.
14 And behold at evening tide trouble; and before the morning he is not.(ASSAD KILLED IN OVERNIGHT RAID) This is the portion of them that spoil us,(ISRAEL) and the lot of them that rob us.
AMOS 1:5
5 I will break also the bar of Damascus, and cut off the inhabitant from the plain of Aven, and him that holdeth the sceptre from the house of Eden:(IRAQ) and the people of Syria shall go into captivity unto Kir,(JORDAN) saith the LORD.(I belive ISIS-DAMASCUS GET NUKED BY ISRAEL)
JEREMEIAH 49:23-27
23 Concerning Damascus.(SYRIA) Hamath is confounded, and Arpad: for they have heard evil tidings: they are fainthearted; there is sorrow on the sea;(WAR SHIPS WITH NUKES COMING ON SYRIA) it cannot be quiet.
24 Damascus is waxed feeble, and turneth herself to flee, and fear hath seized on her: anguish and sorrows have taken her, as a woman in travail.
25 How is the city of praise not left, the city of my joy!
26 Therefore her young men shall fall in her streets, and all the men of war shall be cut off in that day, saith the LORD of hosts.
27 And I will kindle a fire (NUKES OR BOMBS) in the wall of Damascus, and it shall consume the palaces of Benhadad.(ASSADS PALACES POSSIBLY IN DAMASCUS)
PSALMS 83:3-7
3 They (ARABS,MUSLIMS) have taken crafty counsel against thy people,(ISRAEL) and consulted against thy hidden ones.
4 They have said, Come, and let us cut them off from being a nation; that the name of Israel may be no more in remembrance.
5 For they (MUSLIMS) have consulted together with one consent: they are confederate against thee:(TREATIES)
6 The tabernacles of Edom,(JORDAN) and the Ishmaelites;(ARABS) of Moab, PALESTINIANS,JORDAN) and the Hagarenes;(EGYPT)
7 Gebal,(HEZZBALLOH,LEBANON) and Ammon,(JORDAN) and Amalek;(SYRIA,ARABS,SINAI) the Philistines (PALESTINIANS) with the inhabitants of Tyre;(LEBANON)
PM Vows: Hezbollah, Iran Will 'Pay a Price' for Soldiers' Deaths-Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said that those responsible for the deaths of two IDF soldiers would “pay the price for their actions."By Yaakov Levi-First Publish: 1/28/2015, 8:59 PM-ISRAELNATIONALNEWS
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said Wednesday that the parties responsible for the attack on Har Dov earlier in the day that claimed the lives of two IDF soldiers would “pay the full price for their actions.” Netanyahu made the comments Wednesday evening before a meeting of top army and government officials discussing the attack by Hezbollah terrorists earlier Wednesday.Two IDF soldiers were killed earlier Wednesday when Lebanese terror group fired antitank missiles at two IDF vehicles in the Har Dov area (Shebaa Farms) in a Hezbollah ambush.Six casualties in light to moderate condition were taken to Ziv Hospital in Tzfat. Additional casualties were evacuated to Rambam Hospital.The IDF vigorously denied Hezbollah claims that an IDF soldier had been kidnapped, and a Lebanese report later confirmed that Hezbollah had failed to capture an Israeli soldier.The two soldiers killed were identified as Major Yochai Kalangel and Sgt. Dor Nini, the IDF Spokesperson's Office announced. Netanyahu sent condolences to the families of the two victims, and wished the six soldiers injured in the attack a speedy recovery.“Those who committed these acts will pay the full price for their actions,” Netanyahu said. “For a long time Iran has been using Hezbollah to establish a terror front against us on the Golan. We are aggressively acting to prevent this. The government of Lebanon and the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria are responsible for attacks on Israel that emerge from their territory.“Our single goal is to defend Israel and Israelis,” Netanyahu added. “We have acted this way in the past, and will continue to do so.”
UN Security Council Calls Emergency Meeting Over Lebanon-UNIFIL to hold hearing on antitank missile attack on Israeli soil amid fears of an impending war.By Arutz Sheva Staff-First Publish: 1/28/2015, 10:10 PM / Last Update: 1/28/2015, 10:14 PM-ISRAELNATIONALNEWS
The UN Security Council has called an emergency meeting from 2100 GMT on Wednesday to discuss the flare-up of violence on the Israeli-Lebanon border, diplomats told AFP.France requested the urgent talks in the 15-member council after two Israeli soldiers and a Spanish UN peacekeeper died in the exchange of fire between Israeli forces and Hezbollah terrorists.The violence raised fears of another all-out conflict between the two countries, who fought a month-long war in 2006, in a region already wracked by fighting with Islamists in Syria and Iraq.Tension in the area has been building, especially after an Israeli air strike on the Syrian sector of the Golan Heights killed six Hezbollah terrorists and an Iranian general on January 18.Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations told the Security Council in a letter that Israel will take all necessary measures to defend itself in response to the Hezbollah attack."Israel will not stand by as Hezbollah targets Israelis," wrote Ron Prosor in the letter also sent to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.The Israeli envoy demanded that the council condemn Hezbollah and take steps to press Lebanon to disarm the Islamist militants as outlined in UN resolutions.The clashes began when Hezbollah fired an estimated 5-6 anti-tank missiles at a military convoy in Israel, prompting Israel to respond with air and ground strikes.The 10,000-strong UNIFIL mission said it had observed six rockets fired towards Israel from southern Lebanon and that Israeli forces "returned artillery fire in the same general area".The council will be meeting behind closed doors and hear a report from a senior peacekeeping official overseeing UNIFIL operations.
Is Hezbollah Digging Tunnels to Israel? IDF Intends to Find Out-For many, the prospect that Hezbollah is preparing an underground assault is far more worrisome than a mortar attack.By Moshe Cohen-First Publish: 1/28/2015, 5:22 PM-ISRAELNATIONALNEWS
On Wednesday, Hezbollah terrorist fired mortar shells at IDF vehicles in the area of Har Dov in the northern Golan – a serious enough incident, but an open one that the IDF can fight. It's the kind of attack that takes place once in awhile, but residents of northern Israel have learned to take them in stride.Far more worrying to them, however, is the prospect that Hezbollah is preparing another kind of attack – an underground one, via Hamas-style tunnels that many believe are being dug even as Hezbollah attacks IDF jeeps in the Golan.Many residents of the north have complained of hearing underground noises – some of which were very loud, and sounded very much like the sound of heavy drilling. The IDF, said Shimon Gueta, head of the Upper Galilee Regional Council, is taking these reports seriously and is actively examining these complaints. Speaking to Arutz Sheva, Gueta said that he could not explain the phenomenon, but that he had spoken to many IDF officials, and all of them have said that so far, nothing has been found. “Because there have been so many complaints recently, they are intensifying the investigations,” he added.Meanwhile, Gueta said, residents of the north were persevering with the increased security situation that transpired Wednesday, and that most of the area was now “back to normal.” While many tourists who had been set to visit the region this weekend canceled their reservations, Gueta said he was optimistic that visitors would return – if, of course, the situation calms down.Earlier Wednesday, the Lebanese terror group fired antitank missiles at two IDF vehicles in the Har Dov area (Shebaa Farms) in a Hezbollah ambush Wednesday morning. Seven people were wounded and two soldiers were killed. The IDF vigorously denied Hezbollah claims that an IDF soldier had been kidnapped, and a Lebanese report later confirmed that Hezbollah had failed to capture an Israeli soldier.
