NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE USED.
JESUS SHED HIS BLOOD FOR US THAT WE CAN BE SAVED FOREVER.AND DURING WW3 PEOPLES BLOOD WILL BE SHED AS A JUDGEMENT FOR HATING HIM AND ISRAEL.GOD IS NOT MOCKED.
ZEPHANIAH 1:2-3
2 I will utterly consume all things from off the land, saith the LORD.
3 I will consume man and beast; I will consume the fowls of the heaven, and the fishes of the sea, and the stumblingblocks with the wicked; and I will cut off man from off the land, saith the LORD.
PSALMS 97:3
3 A fire goeth before him, and burneth up his enemies round about.
EZEKIEL 5:15-17
15 So it shall be a reproach and a taunt, an instruction and an astonishment unto the (ARAB/MUSLIM) nations that are round about thee,(ISRAEL) when I shall execute judgments in thee in anger and in fury and in furious rebukes. I the LORD have spoken it.
16 When I shall send upon them the evil arrows of famine, which shall be for their destruction, and which I will send to destroy you: and I will increase the famine upon you, and will break your staff of bread:
17 So will I send upon you famine and evil beasts,(WHEN RUSSIA/MUSLIMS GET DEFEATED THIER BODIES GET EATEN BY BIRDS,ANIMALS IN ISRAEL MIGRATION SEASON) and they shall bereave thee; and pestilence and blood shall pass through thee;(NUKES) and I will bring the sword upon thee. I the LORD have spoken it.
REVELATION 14:18-20
18 And another angel came out from the altar, which had power over fire; and cried with a loud cry to him that had the sharp sickle, saying, Thrust in thy sharp sickle, and gather the clusters of the vine of the earth; for her grapes are fully ripe.
19 And the angel thrust in his sickle into the earth, and gathered the vine of the earth, and cast it into the great winepress of the wrath of God.
20 And the winepress was trodden without the city,(JERUSALEM) and blood came out of the winepress, even unto the horse bridles, by the space of a thousand and six hundred furlongs.(200 MILES) (THE SIZE OF ISRAEL)
ISAIAH 66:15-18
15 For, behold, the LORD will come with fire,(NUKES) and with his chariots like a whirlwind, to render his anger with fury, and his rebuke with flames of fire.
16 For by fire and by his sword will the LORD plead with all flesh: and the slain of the LORD shall be many.
17 They that sanctify themselves, and purify themselves in the gardens behind one tree in the midst, eating swine's flesh, and the abomination, and the mouse, shall be consumed together, saith the LORD.
18 For I know their works and their thoughts: it shall come, that I will gather all nations and tongues; and they shall come, and see my glory.
ISAIAH 26:21
21 For, behold, the LORD cometh out of his place to punish the inhabitants of the earth for their iniquity:(GOD/ISRAEL HATE AND BRAKING OF HIS COMMANDMENTS) the earth also shall disclose her blood, and shall no more cover her slain.(WW3,1/2 earths population die - 3 BILLION).
ISAIAH 13:6-13 KJV
6 Howl ye; for the day of the LORD is at hand; it shall come as a destruction from the Almighty.
7 Therefore shall all hands be faint, and every man's heart shall melt:(FROM FRIGHT)
8 And they shall be afraid: pangs and sorrows shall take hold of them; they shall be in pain as a woman that travaileth: they shall be amazed one at another; their faces shall be as flames.
9 Behold, the day of the LORD cometh, cruel both with wrath and fierce anger, to lay the land desolate: and he shall destroy the sinners thereof out of it.
10 For the stars of heaven and the constellations thereof shall not give their light: the sun shall be darkened in his going forth, and the moon shall not cause her light to shine.
11 And I will punish the world for their evil, and the wicked for their iniquity; and I will cause the arrogancy of the proud to cease, and will lay low the haughtiness of the terrible.
12 I will make a man more precious than fine gold; even a man than the golden wedge of Ophir.
13 Therefore I will shake the heavens, and the earth shall remove out of her place, in the wrath of the LORD of hosts, and in the day of his fierce anger.
ISAIAH 24:17-23 KJV
17 Fear, and the pit, and the snare, are upon thee, O inhabitant of the earth.
18 And it shall come to pass, that he who fleeth from the noise of the fear shall fall into the pit; and he that cometh up out of the midst of the pit shall be taken in the snare: for the windows from on high are open, and the foundations of the earth do shake.
19 The earth is utterly broken down, the earth is clean dissolved, the earth is moved exceedingly.
20 The earth shall reel to and fro like a drunkard, and shall be removed like a cottage; and the transgression thereof shall be heavy upon it; and it shall fall, and not rise again.
21 And it shall come to pass in that day, that the LORD shall punish the host of the high ones that are on high, and the kings of the earth upon the earth.
22 And they shall be gathered together, as prisoners are gathered in the pit, and shall be shut up in the prison, and after many days shall they be visited.
23 Then the moon shall be confounded, and the sun ashamed, when the LORD of hosts shall reign in mount Zion, and in Jerusalem, and before his ancients gloriously.
2 TIMOTHY 3:1
1 This know also, that in the last days perilous (DANGEROUS) times shall come.
JOEL 2:3,30
3 A fire devoureth before them;(ATOMIC BOMB) and behind them a flame burneth: the land is as the garden of Eden before them, and behind them a desolate wilderness; yea, and nothing shall escape them.
30 And I will shew wonders in the heavens and in the earth, blood, and fire, and pillars of smoke.
ZECHARIAH 14:12-13
12 And this shall be the plague wherewith the LORD will smite all the people that have fought against Jerusalem; Their flesh shall consume away while they stand upon their feet, and their eyes shall consume away in their holes, and their tongue shall consume away in their mouth.
13 And it shall come to pass in that day, that a great tumult from the LORD shall be among them; and they shall lay hold every one on the hand of his neighbour, and his hand shall rise up against the hand of his neighbour.(1/2-3 BILLION DIE IN WW3)(THIS IS AN ATOMIC BOMB EFFECT)
EZEKIEL 20:47
47 And say to the forest of the south, Hear the word of the LORD; Thus saith the Lord GOD; Behold, I will kindle a fire in thee, and it shall devour every green tree in thee, and every dry tree: the flaming flame shall not be quenched, and all faces from the south to the north shall be burned therein.
ZEPHANIAH 1:18
18 Neither their silver nor their gold shall be able to deliver them in the day of the LORD'S wrath; but the whole land shall be devoured by the fire of his jealousy: for he shall make even a speedy riddance of all them that dwell in the land.
MALACHI 4:1
1 For, behold, the day cometh, that shall burn as an oven; and all the proud, yea, and all that do wickedly, shall be stubble: and the day that cometh shall burn them up, saith the LORD of hosts, that it shall leave them neither root nor branch.
REVELATION 8:7
7 The first angel sounded, and there followed hail and fire mingled with blood, and they were cast upon the earth: and the third part of trees was burnt up, and all green grass was burnt up.
REVELATION 9:18
18 By these three was the third part of men killed, by the fire, and by the smoke, and by the brimstone, which issued out of their mouths.
HALF OF EARTHS POPULATION DIE DURING THE 7 YR TRIBULATION.(THESE VERSES ARE JUDGEMENT SCRIPTURES NOT RAPTURE SCRIPTURES)
LUKE 17:34-37
34 I tell you, in that night there shall be two men in one bed; the one shall be taken,(IN WW3 JUDGEMENT) and the other shall be left.
35 Two women shall be grinding together; the one shall be taken,(IN WW3 JUDGEMENT) and the other left.
36 Two men shall be in the field; the one shall be taken,(IN WW3 JUDGEMENT) and the other left.
37 And they answered and said unto him, Where, Lord? And he said unto them, Wheresoever the body is, thither will the eagles be gathered together.(Christians have new bodies,this is the people against Jerusalem during the 7 yr treaty)(Christians bodies are not being eaten by the birds).
MATTHEW 24:37-51
37 But as the days of Noe were, so shall also the coming of the Son of man be.
38 For as in the days that were before the flood they were eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage, until the day that Noe entered into the ark,
39 And knew not until the flood came, and took them all away; so shall also the coming of the Son of man be.
40 Then shall two be in the field; the one shall be taken,(IN WW3 JUDGEMENT) and the other left.
41 Two women shall be grinding at the mill; the one shall be taken,(IN WW3 JUDGEMENT) and the other left.
42 Watch therefore: for ye know not what hour your Lord doth come.
43 But know this, that if the goodman of the house had known in what watch the thief would come, he would have watched, and would not have suffered his house to be broken up.
44 Therefore be ye also ready: for in such an hour as ye think not the Son of man cometh.
45 Who then is a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath made ruler over his household, to give them meat in due season?
46 Blessed is that servant, whom his lord when he cometh shall find so doing.
47 Verily I say unto you, That he shall make him ruler over all his goods.
48 But and if that evil servant shall say in his heart, My lord delayeth his coming;
49 And shall begin to smite his fellowservants, and to eat and drink with the drunken;
50 The lord of that servant shall come in a day when he looketh not for him, and in an hour that he is not aware of,
51 And shall cut him asunder, and appoint him his portion with the hypocrites: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.
The Iranians are almost there. This is how they did it
Enrichment is accelerating, the warhead is taking shape, a nuclear trigger is deep in development, and the Shahab-3 missile has Israel in range and can detonate in an airburst 600 meters above ground — just like the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki
September 4, 2012, 5:55 pm
37
Since the last century, Iran has
been methodically pursuing the in-house capability of developing a
missile-delivered nuclear bomb. The regime of President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad is now closer than ever — probably in the latter stages of
perfecting an atomic bomb with a multipoint detonation mechanism,
compact enough to insert into a Shahab-3 missile nosecone.For years, the Obama administration, Western
governments, the United Nations, and the International Atomic Energy
Administration (IAEA) have been fully aware of the specific details of
Tehran’s nuclear weapons program, down to the blueprints and names of
the engineers. Whether or not Iran will complete the last leg of its
decades-long journey toward a deliverable atomic bomb is still unknown.
The difference in viewing the cannon is whether you are staring down the
muzzle or observing it through a telescope from a perch 6,000 miles
away. Israel is peering into the muzzle, hence its assessment is
different than Washington’s.Protracted multilateral negotiations,
crippling international sanctions, and even elaborate programs of
sabotage have delayed but not derailed the nearly autarkic program. Now
the world teeters at the brink of a regional war with profound global
ramifications because the threat may have been ignored too long.Here are the four determining factors, the
dynamics of which will govern whether Israel launches a preemptive
attack against Tehran’s massive nuclear infrastructure.
Four technological achievements are key to
completing Tehran’s nuclear weapon: 1) accretion of enough nuclear
materials, highly enriched to 90 percent, to make the bomb; 2) machining
that highly-enriched material into metal for a spheroid warhead so it
can fit into a missile nosecone for detonation; 3) a trigger mechanism
to initiate the atomic explosion at the precise moment of missile
reentry; and, of course, 4) a reliable rocket delivery system to carry
such a weapon.
Pakistan helped Iran start
In many ways, one of the key precursors to
Iran’s nuclear push was India’s May 1974 nuclear bomb test, code-named
“Smiling Buddha.” Twenty years in the making, New Delhi claimed its 1974
underground explosion was a “peaceful test.” But rival Pakistan saw it
as a clear threat. Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto quickly
declared that his country would fight back against “nuclear blackmail.”
The sleepy Pakistani nuclear program roared into action.A pivotal decision was to call upon Abdul
Qadeer Khan, often referred to as “AQ Khan,” revered as the father of
Pakistan’s atomic weaponry. Khan, a Pakistani metallurgist and nuclear
engineer, had worked in the nuclear programs of Holland and other
Western countries. He was brought home to fast-track the building of
Pakistan’s bomb. Quickly, Khan set up uranium-enrichment labs and
ballistic-missile operations, mainly in and around the city of Kahuta,
in the Rawalpindi district of Pakistan. In 1998, after India’s second
nuclear test, Pakistan was ready. Within weeks, Pakistan followed suit,
demonstrating it, too, possessed nuclear weapons and could deploy them
rapidly.
As Pakistan barged into the nuclear age, Khan
spearheaded the proliferation of the technology into other countries. In
a 2009 TV interview, Khan admitted that working with Pakistan’s
intelligence service, the ISI, his country developed a mutual working
relationship with North Korea. After India’s detonation, Pakistan
realized it needed missiles. Long the world’s biggest missile and rocket
power, North Korea was the logical partner. Khan admitted in his TV
interview, “We needed to have long-range missiles to reach the far-flung
cities of India and to ensure our deterrence. I discussed the issue
with Benazir Bhutto as well. She said … we could cooperate with North
Korea.”
Benazir
Bhutto, prime minister of Pakistan, visits North Korea in December 1993
and meets with leader Kim Il Sung. (photo credit: Korean Central News
Agency/Korea News Service via AP Images)
Khan said Benazir Bhutto visited North Korea,
adding, “I [also] had a visit to North Korea to discuss missile
technology. Then the North Koreans came to Pakistan and received money
from Benazir Bhutto so that we could start the missile program … It was
not that costly; I think it was hardly worth $50 million.”
He continued, “I have only been to North Korea
twice — in 1994 and 1999. In 1999, General [Pervez] Musharraf sent me
along with General Iftikhar [Ali Khan], who was then the chief of the
Air Defense Command. We were fighting India at Kargil, and we were in
dire need of antiaircraft missiles … We went to North Korea and
purchased 200 missiles from them.”Khan added, “A North Korean team would visit
the Kahuta plant during the same period as our missile deal was taking
place, and it was no secret … Everyone knew about it. They would stay at
a guest house in the vicinity of Kahuta plant.” He continued, “The
North Korean engineers would visit our director generals in their
departments to observe different operations.”
In that 2009 TV interview, Khan also recalled,
“Iran was interested in acquiring nuclear technology. Since Iran was an
important Muslim country, we wished Iran to acquire this technology …
Iran’s nuclear capability will neutralize Israel’s power. We had advised
Iran to contact the suppliers and purchase equipment from them.” Khan
identified those initial suppliers as “a company with which we had
established links when we could not receive the material from Europe.
They were Sri Lankan Muslims.”Step by step, initially with Pakistan’s
assistance, and then as a self-driven engine, Iran embarked on
assembling the four key elements needed to wield a nuclear bomb.
The rush to enrich
One foundation of a common atomic bomb design
requires a sufficient quantity of uranium enriched to weapons-grade, or
90 percent. If missile-delivered, this material can then be converted
into a metal that can be shaped into a dense spheroid — the warhead —
small enough to fit into a nosecone. It is all a matter of weights and
measures.A basic method of enriching nuclear material
is to whirl it around in centrifuges at a high rate of speed, thus
separating out or purifying the desired uranium isotopes. Compare the
process to distillation. The enrichment yield can be multiplied by
acquiring more and more basic nuclear material, and then subjecting it
to ever more cascades of linked centrifuges for longer processing.Even operating at varying rates of efficiency,
fast and slow, the ceaseless, metronomic output of Iranian centrifuges
will eventually yield the quantity needed for several bombs. Experts
estimate that a single bomb would require approximately 25 kilograms of
Highly Enriched Uranium, or HEU, that has been boosted to at least
higher concentrations of 90 percent.Iran is now operating at least 10,000
centrifuges, probably many more, in its slow-motion dash to acquire the
vital nuclear weight it requires. The startling number of more than
10,000 centrifuges is about ten times the known arrays Iran admitted to
just a few years ago in 2007. Indeed, the country has been adding
centrifuges at a dazzling rate — not incrementally but in great leaps of
thousands of additional machines at a time. True, some are
old-fashioned centrifuges, some wear down after ten years of operation,
and some are working inefficiently. But some possess newer technology.
Together, efficiently or inefficiently, these thousands of machines are
conjointly increasing the stock of basic nuclear material, month by
month.
File
photo of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visiting the uranium
enrichment facility at Natanz. (photo credit: AP/Iranian President’s
office, File)
After years of centrifugal processing, Iran
already has accumulated enough low enriched uranium, or LEU, to create
five or six bombs — that is, if the LEU material would be boosted to
weapons-grade, or 90 percent. With each passing day, that LEU stock
expands in volume and potency. Much of Iran’s nuclear enrichment remains
at 3.5 percent level. But Iran has admitted and inspectors have
verified that the country has already reached the 20 percent threshold
(actually 19.75 percent), producing by now about 300 kilograms — enough
to move to the next steps of weapons-grade. Those steps must first
enrich to the next level, say the 60 percent level, and from there to 90
percent, which is bomb quality.Enriching to 3.5 percent is 75 percent of the
task of reaching weapons-grade. Once Iran has reached 20 percent, it
gone 90 percent of the distance to making weapons-grade uranium. In
other words, once the process has been mastered to 20 percent, it is
only a matter of time before 90 percent bomb-quality HEU can be created.
Depending upon the number of cascades and centrifuges acting in
concert, Iran could amass some 25 kilograms of bomb-ready 90 percent HEU
in six months to a year. Within a year, at its current rate of
exponential growth, Iran could have enough HEU to arm several bombs.To fortify its unstoppable enrichment process,
Tehran has constructed numerous redundant facilities, some underground,
perhaps some operating in secret outside the sightlines of IAEA
monitors. Some are in hospitals. Iran agreed to permit IAEA inspectors
when, in 1974, it signed the “Safeguards Agreement.” The Safeguards
Agreement is an adjunct to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that
Tehran adopted in 1968 when it took its first baby steps toward the
“Nuclear Club.”Each Iranian enrichment facility — known or
unknown — is crammed with those iconic cascades of tall and shiny
aluminum centrifuges. Each cascade is comprised of dozens of centrifuges
like long hands with many fingers. The march is almost unstoppable. If
one cascade goes down, if a complete multi-cascade “production hall”
stops operating, indeed if an entire plant is destroyed, others
elsewhere in Iran will pick up the pace. Hour by hour, day by day, those
centrifuges incrementally crank out the nuclear material needed to
create the kilograms of HEU needed for a bomb. Despite international
sanctions and global pressure, the centrifuges spin nonstop. The
centrifugal forces have only accelerated. The clock is ticking.But the lethality of Iran’s weapons program
cannot be assessed merely by measuring the size and enrichment level of
its nuclear material. That is one measure — but only one — of four
indispensable measurements. All the gunpowder in the world will not make
a bullet. It must be manufactured. That bullet needs a rifle before it
can be shot. Finally, it needs a marksman in position.The next step requires Iran’s growing stock of
enriched uranium to be shaped into a weaponized spheroid object — the
warhead. That process has been underway for many years.
Spherodization of uranium metal into a warhead
For the past 15 years, Iran has been on a
quest to master the machining and engineering skills needed to transform
Highly Enriched Uranium into a spheroidal or hemispherical mass that
could be loaded into a missile cone to constitute the warhead.Tehran long ago acknowledged to the IAEA that
it indeed established “contacts with intermediaries of a clandestine
nuclear-supply network in 1987 and the early 1990s, and that, in 1987,
it had received … a 15-page document (hereafter referred to as the
‘uranium metal document’), which outlines the conversion of uranium
fluoride compounds into uranium metal and the production of
hemispherical enriched uranium metallic components.”The campaign to build and detonate a nuclear
spheroid payload has been years in the making. Iranian scientists who
contacted Khan and his circles were particularly eager to learn more
about “neutron cross-section calculations … and shock-wave interactions
with metals,” according to a November 8, 2011 IAEA report compiled by
the agency’s director general to its Board of Governors. Later, Iranian
scientists sought “complex calculations relating to the state of
criticality of a solid sphere of uranium being compressed by high
explosives,” that same IAEA report attributes to a Member State. Such
calculations are essential to test the potency of any spheroid warhead
Iran would load into a missile nosecone. The IAEA admits it has known
about this aspect of the Iranian weaponization effort since 2005.As early as 2003, Iran undertook, “to initiate
a high-explosive charge in the form of a hemispherical shell,” as
detailed in a November 2011 IAEA report that features a special extended
Annex labeled “Possible Military Dimensions to Iran’s Nuclear Program.”
The Annex, published by the IAEA, laid out the details obtained through
its Member States.“During that experiment,” the Annex explained,
“the internal hemispherical curved surface of the high-explosive charge
was monitored using a large number of optical-fiber cables, and the
light output of the explosive upon detonation was recorded with a
high-speed streak camera. It should be noted that the dimensions of the
initiation system and the explosives used with it were consistent with
the dimensions for the new payload, which … were given to the engineers
who were studying how to integrate the new payload into the chamber of
the Shahab-3 missile reentry vehicle.” Then, in 2005, the IAEA’s
November 2011 military annex asserts, Iran sought the expertise to
assemble “the complex calculations relating to the state of criticality
of a solid sphere of uranium being compressed by high explosives.”To better perfect the weaponization of a HEU
spheroid warhead, Iran must test and measure the metal ball’s reaction
to those high explosives. These studies are known as hydrodynamics
because they measure when material is so massively compressed and heated
that it begins to flow and function like a fluid. This brings into play
an understanding of fluid dynamics.The IAEA’s November 2011 military annex makes
clear that “throughout the entire timeline,” inspectors have documented
Iran’s acquisition of items that “would be useful in the development of a
nuclear explosive device.” The Annex enumerates with extreme
specificity that these items include “high-speed electronic switches and
spark gaps (useful for triggering and firing detonators); high-speed
cameras (useful in experimental diagnostics); neutron sources (useful
for calibrating neutron-measuring equipment); radiation detection and
measuring equipment (useful in a nuclear-material production
environment); and training courses on topics relevant to
nuclear-explosives development (such as neutron cross-section
calculations and shock-wave interactions/hydrodynamics).”Indeed, that November 2011 Annex devotes an
entire section, Section C.7., entitled “Hydrodynamic Experiments,” to
detailing the steps Iran has taken to test the detonation of spheroidal
metals. The section states that “Iran has manufactured simulated
nuclear-explosive components using high-density materials such as
tungsten.” It also speaks of databanks of modeling and calculations “to
monitor the symmetry of the compressive shock of the simulated core of a
nuclear device.”Most alarming, states the Annex, is the
discovery of a unique “large-explosives containment vessel in which to
conduct hydrodynamic experiments.” The vessel has been in the Parchin
complex for over a decade, according to the IAEA report. So well
authenticated is this massive cylindrical containment vessel, with its
characteristic external piping to siphon off and register explosive
results, that the Associated Press felt sure enough to syndicate a
sketch of the chamber. The AP sketch of the explosion testing chamber
with its distinctive yellow piping was published worldwide earlier this
year.
Sketch
of a large-explosives containment vessel in which to conduct
hydrodynamic experiments believed to be situated inside Iran’s Parchin
military site. (photo credit: AP)
The IAEA military annex concludes,
“Hydrodynamic experiments such as those described above, which involve
high explosives in conjunction with nuclear material or nuclear-material
surrogates, are strong indicators of possible weapon development.”How far along the path of perfecting the
metallurgy, spheroidization, and the control of that spheroid under
intense detonation is unknown. But the real question is can a warhead be
detonated?
Nuclear warhead detonation
A super-precise, multipoint detonating trigger
would be needed to initiate the atomic chain reaction that will produce
the bomb with its mushroom cloud. The deadly spheroid cannot just be
match-lit with a fuse or beat with a hammer. Such a device must be
detonated with a super-sophisticated nuclear trigger engineered with the
extraordinary precision and synchrony requisite to initiate the
implosion.The nuclear trigger now in the latter stages
of development in Iran is the R265 system. Specifically, the R265
employs a multipoint shock generator that causes a simultaneous
implosion from all sides surrounding the spheroidal weaponized material,
according to the IAEA intelligence distributed to all Western
governments. It must be compact. The Shahab-3 tri-conic nosecone
features a diameter of 600 millimeters, according to missile weapons
experts. The outer radius of the R265 system offers a “diameter of 550
millimeters, less than the estimated diameter of about 600 millimeters
available inside the payload chamber of a Shahab-3,” according to a
recent report by the nuclear experts at the Institute for Science and
International Security (ISIS), nuclear armament experts who have access
to IAEA reports and monitor all developments in Iran’s nuclear program.The hemispherical aluminum of the R265 shell
that will host the implosion sequence is 265 millimeter thick, leaving a
10 millimeter distance for the sequence. According to a November 2011
ISIS report released in tandem to the IAEA military annex, the design
appears simple, even if making it work with microsecond synchrony is a
prodigious task of engineering. “Outer channels are cut into the outer
surface of the shell,” explains the ISIS report, “each channel one by
one millimeter.” The report adds, “Each channel terminates in a
cylindrical hole, 5 mm in diameter, that is drilled though the shell and
contains an explosive pellet.” The explosive pellets, the November 2011
ISIS report continues, will be made of PETN. The powerful explosive
PETN is the one many terrorists have chosen.“The geometrical pattern formed by channels
and holes is arranged in quadrants on the outer hemispheric surface,
which allows a single central point of initiation and the simultaneous
detonation of explosives in all the holes on the hemisphere,” according
to the November 2011 ISIS report. That outer detonation constitutes
merely stage one.The simultaneous initiation of a high
explosive in the outer hemisphere impacts a second interior device known
as “exploding bridgewire” (EBW). The timing will not be measured in
seconds, or even milliseconds—which are one-thousandths of a second—but
in microseconds. A microsecond is one-millionth of a second.As far back as May 2008, an IAEA report
stated, “Iran acknowledged that it had conducted simultaneous testing
with two to three EBW detonators with a time precision of about one
microsecond.” Indeed, the IAEA confirmed that such testing of EBW
detonators has been underway at least since February 2004 and probably
since 2003 utilizing “as many as 500 EBW detonators.” ISIS states, “Iran
would need only two EBWs to initiate a nuclear explosion.”In a February 2008 weaponization briefing
obtained ISIS, the IAEA described some Iranian research graphics it had
discovered. “Several sketches for a missile head integrating the chamber
described above were shown,” the IAEA briefing notes detail,
“indicating the electronic mechanism and the spherical warhead. They do
not, however, give an explicit indication that it’s a nuclear weapon.
The following stages of the project are mentioned in the slides:
configuration of the structure, design of material, connections,
tightness of chamber seal, test of design, [and] tolerance of surface
states. Mathematical simulations appear to have been done to define the
centers of mass, the equilibrium of the charges, the whole coinciding
with the parameters for a Shahab-3 warhead.”Some of the EBW testing was done in what a
2008 IAEA briefing describes as “a 400m deep shaft located 10 km from a
firing control point,” which “shows the placement of various electronic
systems such as a control unit and a high-voltage power generator.”With the R265 and EBWs operational, Tehran’s
device would require the final ingredient to make it a working nuclear
bomb: the neutron initiator. Iran has it.IAEA inspectors have identified the foreign
expert who gave Iran the expertise to operate at split-microsecond
speed. His name is Vycheslav V. Danilenko, a Ukrainian engineer employed
for three decades in the Soviet Union’s nuclear-weapon complex at
Chelyabinsk-70. In the early 1960s, Danilenko worked as “a member of the
gas dynamics group” says an ISIS summary of IAEA documents. His
specialty was precision photography and measurement of high-explosive
detonation and shock compression. The high-explosive by-products were
nanodiamonds, also known as UDD (ultra-dispersed diamonds).The ISIS summary states that after falling on
hard economic times in the early 1990s, Danilenko “contacted the Iranian
embassy in mid-1995, offering his expertise on UDD. At the end of the
year, he was contacted by Dr. Seyed Abbas Shahmoradi,” a top controller
at the Iran’s nuclear establishment. Ultimately, says the ISIS summary,
“Danilenko signed a contract with Shahmoradi.” ISIS adds, “The IAEA has
reviewed publications by Danilenko and has met with him. It has been
able to verify through three separate sources, including the expert
himself, that he was in Iran during that time.”In December 2009, ISIS published a further
report on Iran’s nuclear-weapon progress that described the vital role
of the neutron initiator in activating the chain reaction that makes the
warhead explode as a nuclear bomb. That report describes, “a neutron
initiator made out of uranium deuteride (UD3), which, when finished (and
subsequently manufactured), would most likely be placed at the center
of a fission bomb made from weapons-grade uranium. This type of
initiator works by the high explosives compressing the nuclear core and
[then] the initiator producing a spurt of neutrons as a result of fusion
… The neutrons flood the core of weapons-grade uranium and initiate the
chain reaction.”The December 2009 ISIS report indicates work
on a neutron initiator might have occurred even before 2003, adding,
“Although Iran might claim that this work is for civil purposes, it has
no civil application.” That ISIS report also makes clear that getting
the neutron initiator operable “would be the hardest measurement Iran
would need to make in developing a nuclear weapon … The timing of the
explosion and resulting shock waves would need to be perfect in order to
get enough fusion to create a spurt of neutrons in a reliable manner at
exactly the right instant.” The report adds, “This approach was
followed by Pakistan in the early 1980s.”Indeed, a Pakistani neutron initiator can be
seen at on the cover of the book, Dr. A. Q. Khan on Science and
Education. The book shows AQ Khan standing in front of a green
chalkboard with his design for a multipoint nuclear-bomb trigger
featuring a neutron initiator distinctly labeled in the middle of the
warhead.
The
book, Dr. A. Q. Khan on Science and Education, shows Khan standing in
front of a green chalkboard with his design for a multipoint
nuclear-bomb trigger featuring a neutron initiator distinctly labeled in
the middle of the warhead. (photo credit: Courtesy)
With 25 kilograms of enough highly enrichment
uranium converted into a deadly metallic sphere compact enough to be
inserted inside a 600-millimeter tri-conic nosecone and encased in a
two-stage R265 shock generator working in tandem with an EBW to ignite a
neutron initiator, Iran would still need a reliable delivery vehicle.Iran has it: the Shabab-3.
Shahab-3 missile delivery — airburst at 600 meters
Iran’s main nuclear warhead-ready missile is
the Shahab-3, the renamed North Korean No-Dong 1, which is based on a
Russian Scud-C design. In Farsi, Shahab means Meteor. While Iran
possesses various North Korean missiles relabeled with Farsi names such
as the Shabab-1 and Shabab-2, the Shahab-3 is uniquely suited to deliver
a nuclear bomb to Israel. The Shahab-3 is designed to carry a warhead
of approximately 800-1000 kilograms, and boasts a range of some 1200
kilometers — far enough to reach Israel.Most importantly, it can detonate not only
upon impact, but in an airburst above ground. The lethal Shahab-3
missiles are truck-mobile, so they can shoot from a parking lot or a
pistachio grove. No one can be sure how many Shahab-3s are held in
Tehran’s inventory, but certainly it is scores, if not hundreds. Videos
show Iran shooting several at once. This particular missile is the one
that IAEA inspectors and governments most closely associate with Iran’s
nuclear weapon program. They have been worried about it for years.
ISIS notes from a February 2008 IAEA
weaponization briefing state: “The information presented, which included
multimedia files, describes several aspects of what could be
nuclear-weapons development [including] instructions on …
missile-reentry vehicle research including the chronology of
events-separation of the missile, loss-of-tracking, switching on of
altitude detectors, and timing of firing devices leading to an explosion
at an altitude of about 600 meters. The IAEA notes that the altitude
described in the documents excludes the possibility that the warhead was
designed to accommodate conventional explosives or chemical and
biological charges.”A 2008 IAEA report recounts a discussion with
the Iranians about “parameters and development work related to the
Shahab-3 missile, in particular technical aspects of a reentry vehicle.”
IAEA inspectors “made available to Iran for examination a computer
image … showing a schematic layout of the contents of the inner cone of a
reentry vehicle. This layout has been assessed by the agency as quite
likely to be able to accommodate a nuclear device.” Iran denied the
authenticity of the schematic.The November 2011 IAEA military annex reflects
alarm regarding “high explosives (including the development of
exploding bridgewire detonators) and re-engineering of the payload
chamber of the Shahab 3 missile reentry vehicle.” When the November 2011
IAEA report cited its concern over “at least one large-scale experiment
in 2003 to initiate a high-explosive charge in the form of a
hemispherical shell,” the agency specified in the same paragraph that
“the explosives used with it were consistent with the dimensions for the
new payload, which, according to the alleged studies documentation,
were given to the engineers who were studying how to integrate the new
payload into the chamber of the Shahab 3 missile reentry vehicle.”Later, in a subsequent section of that
November 2011 IAEA military annex entitled “Fusing, Arming and Firing
system,” the inspectors report that they asked the Tehran authorities
about design graphics that reflect efforts to “integrate the new payload
into the reentry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile [and] … the
development of a prototype firing system that would enable the payload
to explode both in the air above a target or upon impact of the reentry
vehicle.” Iran formally replied that the graphics were a mere “animation
game.” In other words, Iran dismissed the nuclear-bomb graphics as a
sort of doodle.The matter came up again last year in a
section of the November 2011 IAEA military annex entitled “Integration
into a Missile Delivery Vehicle.” The IAEA Board of Governors repeated,
“The project appears to have consisted of a structured and comprehensive
program of engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new
spherical payload into the existing payload chamber, which would be
mounted in the reentry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile.”The reason Iran’s pursuit of an airburst
detonation of approximately 600 meters is so troubling to IAEA inspector
is because the inspectors know their history. The atomic bombs dropped
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki were designed to detonate as an airburst—at
600 meters.
How sure is sure?
Just how sure is the IAEA about its findings.
The agency certainly tends to liberally sprinkle the word “alleged” and
“alleged documentation” throughout its reportage. That is the pro forma
language of such international bodies. But to address any reservation on
the authenticity of the information assembled, the IAEA in its 2011
military annex took the rare opportunity of including a full section
entitled “Credibility of Information.”The Credibility of Information section assured
the authenticity of the data, certifying that it relied upon “a large
volume of documentation (including correspondence, reports, graphs from
presentations, videos, and engineering drawings), amounting to over a
thousand pages. The information reflected in that documentation is of a
technically complex and interconnected nature, showing research,
development, and testing activities over time. It also contains
working-level correspondence consistent with the day-to-day
implementation of a formal programme. Consistent with the Agency’s
practice, that information has been carefully and critically examined.
The Agency has also had several meetings with the Member State [Iran] to
clarify the information it had provided, to question the Member State
[Iran] about the forensics it had carried out on the documentation and
the information reflected in it, and to obtain more information on the
underlying sources.”The Credibility of Information section added
that the IAEA information was obtained from diverse sources and vetted
by official bodies in numerous countries. “In addition to the alleged
studies documentation,” the IAEA November 2011 military annex states,
“the Agency has received information from more than ten Member States.
This has included procurement information, information on international
travel by individuals said to have been involved in the alleged
activities, financial records, documents reflecting health and safety
arrangements, and other documents demonstrating manufacturing techniques
for certain high-explosive components. This information reinforces and
tends to corroborate the information reflected in the alleged studies
documentation and relates to activities substantially beyond those
identified in that documentation.”Driving home the degree of certitude, the IAEA
annex averred, “In addition to the information referred to … the Agency
has acquired information as a result of its own efforts, including
publications and articles acquired through open-source research,
satellite imagery, the results of Agency verification activities, and
information provided by Iran in the context of those verification
activities. Importantly, the Agency has also had direct discussions with
a number of individuals who were involved in relevant activities in
Iran, including, for example, an interview with a leading figure in the
clandestine nuclear-supply network. The information obtained by the
Agency from the discussions with these individuals is consistent with
the information provided by Member States, and that acquired through its
own efforts, in terms of time frames and technical content.”That IAEA military annex complains of Iran’s
obstruction. While “Iran has acknowledged certain information reflected
in the alleged studies documentation … many of the answers given by Iran
to questions posed by the Agency in connection with efforts to resolve
the Agency’s concerns have been imprecise and/or incomplete, and the
information has been slow in coming and sometimes contradictory.” In
addition, the IAEA complains of secret activities, saying, “The
existence of previously undeclared parts of Iran’s nuclear programme,
have tended to increase the Agency’s concerns, rather than dispel them.”In a final statement, the agency make the
blanket statement: “Based on these considerations, and in light of the
Agency’s general knowledge of the Iranian nuclear programme and its
historical evolution, the Agency finds the information upon which Part C
of this Annex is based to be, overall, credible.”In summation, based on voluminous data, the
IAEA reiterates its concern: “Iran has carried out activities that are
relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.”Just days ago, on August 30, the IAEA Board of
Governors issued a statement with Restricted Distribution reiterating
its long-held conclusion: “Since 2002, the Agency has become
increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of
undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military-related
organizations, including activities related to the development of a
nuclear payload for a missile.” The August 30 statement emphasizes once
again, “Iran has carried out activities that are relevant to the
development of a nuclear explosive device. This information, which comes
from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of
Member States, from the Agency’s own efforts, and from information
provided by Iran itself, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall,
credible.”In its August 30, 2012 report summary, the
IAEA concluded that it was more or less giving up: “As Iran is not
providing the necessary cooperation,” the IAEA stated, “the Agency is
unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that
all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities”
News and revelations
The point of these revelations about Iran’s
advanced warhead design is that they are not revelations at all. The
news is that these revelations are old news. They have been known to
Western governments for many months and in some cases several years.
This information was not given to this writer in a Georgetown briefing
by a defense official or in a Tel Aviv café by a Mossad operative.
Everything quoted here is robustly searchable on the Internet. Almost
none of it is taken from media reports, but rather from governmental,
official or quasi-official sources publically available. For some 15
years, Iran has been building a bomb. Government leaders know this.
Herman
Nackaerts, Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of
Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, left, and
Iran’s Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Ali
Asghar Soltanieh speak to journalists after their talks at the permanent
mission of Iran in Vienna on Aug. 24, 2012. (photo credit: AP
Photo/Hans Punz)
Israel will wait until the last moment,
diplomatic sources say, allowing every nonmilitary lever to work.
Ultimately, Israel will rely upon itself as it did when it destroyed the
Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 in Operation Babylon and, according to
foreign reports, the budding Syrian-North Korean reactor in 2007 in
Operation Orchard.To the question of when any such attack on
Iran might occur, the best minds say, “He who knows does not speak; he
who speaks does not know.” But the best sense is that when and if it
happens, the noise will be deafening and reverberate for a long time.———–Edwin Black
is the author of the international best sellers IBM and the Holocaust,
Banking on Baghdad, and The Farhud. He can be found at
www.edwinblack.com.
